

The Carnegie Corporation and Public Broadcasting (Part A)

INTRODUCTION

“Art, we need you. We need Carnegie on this,” said David Ives, a staffer at Boston-based educational broadcasting station WGBH. In his New York office, Carnegie Corporation officer Arthur Singer shifted the phone and listened intently as Ives continued. “There’s a real need and opportunity to create a better system for educational broadcasting, and you at the foundation can help make it happen. What do you think?”

Ives and WGBH-TV Boston General Manager Hartford Gunn were drafting a speech for soon-to-be WGBH Chairman Ralph Lowell to present at a December 1964 conference on the financing of educational television stations. The conference, funded by a grant from the U.S. Office of Education, had been convened by the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) to catalyze expanded support for educational broadcasting. Ives, Gunn, and Lowell were developing an idea for a new approach, the creation of a commission to “collect information, listen to testimony, and recommend a national policy” regarding educational television in America.

Ives reminded Singer that, despite the licensing and operation of educational television stations around the country, the field was underdeveloped technologically, lacked sustainable financing, and needed institutional direction. Historically, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had been unable to overcome resistance from corporate stations and the networks – ABC, CBS, and NBC – to regulations calling for educational airtime. Singer understood that, with vision and infrastructure, educational broadcasting had the unique potential to advance learning, democratize knowledge, and celebrate the cultural life of the nation.

Champions of educational broadcasting hoped that President Lyndon Johnson would take action on the issue, despite competing demands for funding of other social programs and the growing war in Vietnam. At the White House, Johnson was privately supportive of educational broadcasting, but he hesitated to go public with his support because of the appearance of a possible conflict of interest associated with his family’s ownership of radio and TV stations in Texas. Ives and Gunn had decided to contact Carnegie for advice as they wrote a proposal into Lowell’s upcoming speech. With Singer they discussed the potential for a Carnegie-sponsored commission.

Art Singer knew that the Carnegie Corporation, one of the nation’s largest private foundations, had in the past effectively used its convening power and financial resources to bring objective voices and policy influence to bear on problems of national importance such as medical education and race relations. On the issue of public television, Singer thought, various questions presented themselves. Should the Carnegie Corporation even take on this complex issue? Was a

Senior Research Associate John Kalafatas prepared this teaching case under the supervision of Professor Joel Fleishman and Professor Frederick Mayer as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either the effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. In addition to footnoted sources, information was drawn from a descriptive case written by Steven Schindler for Joel Fleishman.

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Carnegie-led commission the best way to contribute, or would some other form of involvement be better? If new public policy and legislation were needed, would the political waters be navigable? Before hanging up the phone, Singer responded to Ives optimistically, “David, I think this is something Carnegie may be interested in doing. Let me talk with our president, John Gardner, and I’ll get back to you.”

THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

Andrew Carnegie

In 1889, as he continued to lead the expansion of the steel industry and amass his fortune, the Scottish-born business magnate and self-made man Andrew Carnegie published his manifesto on giving, *The Gospel of Wealth*. In 1911, at age 65, Carnegie sold his Carnegie Steel Company to J. P. Morgan for \$480 million (\$9.5 billion in 2005 dollars) and devoted the rest of his life to his philanthropic activities and to writing his autobiography. Wanting his philanthropy to “do real and permanent good in this world,” Carnegie during his life gave away over \$350 million in 1911 dollars – or \$7 billion in 2005 dollars. One of his lifelong interests was the establishment of free public libraries, to make available to everyone a means of self-education. In support of this cause, Carnegie and his foundation gave over \$56 million to build 2,509 libraries throughout the English-speaking world, an investment of more than \$1 billion in 2005 dollars.

The Creation of the Carnegie Corporation of New York

With a 1911 gift of \$125 million (\$2.5 billion in 2005) that made it largest philanthropic trust in the world, Carnegie also founded a private, independent, grant-making foundation – the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Corporation’s mission was to promote “the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding among the people of the United States” and, to a lesser degree, the people in those countries that had been members of the British Commonwealth. Andrew Carnegie would serve as the Corporation’s first president and as a trustee.

Acknowledging that “no wise man will bind trustees forever to certain paths, causes, or institutions,” Carnegie charged the trustees as follows: “best conform to my wishes by using their judgment.”¹ After Carnegie’s death and the execution of his will in 1919, another \$10 million of his assets were transferred to the trust, and the founder-chosen trustees began electing full-time, salaried chief executive officers of the Corporation.

By 1965, the Carnegie Corporation held assets of \$343 million and was making \$13 million in grants yearly, equivalent in 2005 dollars to \$2 billion in assets and \$300 million in grants. (By 2005, the Corporation would continue to be one of the world’s largest foundations, focusing on the areas of education, international peace and security, international development, and strengthening U.S. democracy.²)

Philanthropy and Public Policy at the Carnegie Corporation

Over its history, the Carnegie Corporation, in order to “advance and diffuse knowledge and understanding,” employed a variety of philanthropic strategies that addressed issues of public concern. The Corporation established or endowed institutions, such as the Carnegie libraries and the American Law Institute; funded research in the social, medical, and physical sciences; sponsored the writing of books on social issues, such as Gunnar Myrdal’s pioneering study of

¹*About the Carnegie Corporation*, www.carnegie.org (2005).

²Ibid.

race, *An American Dilemma*; financed conferences and exchanges; and convened commissions to assess and make recommendations on public issues. Often indirectly, sometimes directly, the Carnegie Corporation's activities influenced public policy.³

As Ellen Condliffe Lagemann describes in her book on Carnegie and the Carnegie Corporation, *The Politics of Knowledge*, increasingly in the twentieth century, foundations played an influential role in driving the knowledge agenda that informed and affected public policy. Learning, scholarship, and knowledge became increasingly important to the management of organizations,

. . . to economic activity, and to the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policy. . . . Universities and research bureaus of an ever increasing number and variety, many financed by private foundations like the Carnegie Corporation, as well as by public foundations like the National Science Foundation and public agencies like the Department of Agriculture, began to manage the development and diffusion of knowledge through the award or denial of support for research, dissemination, and training activities.⁴

Foundations defined (1) the "fields of knowledge and which approaches within different fields would become more or less authoritative and . . . considered relevant to policy-making," (2) "how experts would communicate with non-experts" and whether "those governing would be immediately responsible managers, that is, members of the elites, or everyone affected by public policies," and (3) who could access the "knowledge-producing elites that emerged and proliferated as the United States became a more national and bureaucratically organized society."⁵

Per Lagemann, the direction and character of the Carnegie Corporation's public policy engagement was driven by Andrew Carnegie's founding values and by the Corporation's propensity to support and work *with* political leaders, institutions, and policies, rather than against or outside government.

The Corporation's commitment to liberalism was manifest in constellations of values sustained through time. First, there was a belief in the individual's efficacy and in the need for freedom to strive, to improve oneself, and to advance through education; second, a recognition that liberty without equality, at least in the sense of equal opportunity, would result in an unstable and oppressive social situation in which liberty itself would be insecure; and third, a conviction that individualism, liberty, and equal opportunity could best be preserved and advanced in a society where voluntary action and a consensus about national direction would preclude monopoly of power under the auspices of official agencies of government. However these constellations changed in details as they were built into changing grants and programs, they remained, in their essential forms, the touchstone for all the Corporation stood for, supported, and did. . . .

If an allegiance to liberalism was the first constant theme in the Corporation's history, the second was a tendency to support government policies. Beyond

³Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989) p: 3.

⁴Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989) , p: 4.

⁵Ibid, pp. 4-5.

[encouraging] these resonances across lines dividing private and public agencies interested in public policy, the Corporation's policymakers sometimes assisted government policymakers in realizing a program or plan . . . , supported the personal or political interests of a particular president . . . , [or] even offered national leadership in public policy arenas outside the boundaries of federal authority. . . .⁶

Carnegie's involvement with public policy evolved through four periods. During the first decade (1911-1919), when "more scientific assumptions . . . were coming to dominate effective social initiatives" and other Progressive Era institutions, the Corporation under Andrew Carnegie's leadership did not engage directly in policy and instead took a "broad approach to grant-making . . . consistent with 19th Century conceptions of distributive rather than regulatory policy-making." From 1919 to 1923, subsequent Corporation presidents, such as "progressive conservatives" Elihu Root and Henry Smith Pritchett, pursued "scientific philanthropy," making "large institution-building grants, intended to establish centers of public policy expertise" and intervene in debates on policy related to natural sciences, economics, and common law. In a partial return to the founding years, Frederick Keppel, president from 1923 to 1941, led more local giving in smaller amounts, "directed more by hunch, coincidence, opportunity, friendship, and a wish to help than by clear, specific, consistently applied 'scientific' goals or principles" designed to make an impact on national issues. After World War II, however, under presidents Devereaux Josephs, Charles Dollard, John Gardner, and Alan Pifer, the Corporation pursued "strategic philanthropy," deliberately working to achieve intended outcomes on issues of common concern to large foundations and public agencies using "carefully thought-through, articulated, and criticized rationales for action." Policy themes included "foreign policy, greater excellence in education, and more equal access to the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of American life."⁷

Alternative Foundation Strategies at Carnegie

More so than many other foundations, Carnegie had a tradition of addressing national social challenges through strategies other than strict financial grantmaking to organizations providing direct services in the field. Carnegie had a track record of commissioning high-impact special projects, such as Abraham Flexner's 1910 report that changed medical education and Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 study, *The American Dilemma*, which influenced how Americans thought about race relations.

John Gardner, Carnegie President from 1955 to 1967, created an environment that encouraged innovative approaches to the foundation's work. According to Arthur Singer, a Carnegie officer from 1963 to 1967,

Gardner had an enlightened idea. He said that foundations, unlike all other organizations, have no real constituency to whom they are really accountable. They are subject only to a few regulations and indirectly accountable to the public for use of tax-exempt funds. Seeing this independence as an opportunity, Gardner asked us, "Are we exploiting this freedom? Are we taking advantage of our ability and power to do what we want to do, what we think is best, what other organizations cannot do?" Although he left Carnegie before fully developing the idea, Gardner was considering moving the Corporation away from traditional

⁶Ibid, pp: 9-10.

⁷Ibid, pp: 6-8.

grantmaking. Gardner saw us becoming more of an “appraisal organization,” not a grantmaking organization. Gardner asked the staff to come up with appraisals of issue areas where Carnegie could take the alternative approach. In fact, one of my colleagues, Lloyd Morrisett, raised non-commercial television as a potential opportunity.⁸

Lloyd Morrisett, a Carnegie officer from 1959 to 1969, described Gardner’s approach as “planting seeds,” working in an organic rather than directive way with foundation staff to generate, test, and, if viable, grow ideas for the foundation’s impact. Arthur Singer recalled three primary options for generating an assessment and recommendations on a social issue:

One strategy was for the Corporation to fund an individual scholar or expert to produce a unilateral analysis of an issue. Another common option was to provide a grant – potentially through a competitive process – to a university to conduct a study. The strategy of convening a commission was less common because it tended to be a more labor intensive approach and because foundation officers are judged primarily on giving funds away, rather than investing significant time in managing such a project.⁹

Morrisett noted that one advantage of such approaches during the early 1960s was that foundation and university presidents “carried great prestige in those days and were viewed by many as wise and trustworthy men, real leaders who had the public interest at heart.” But for Morrisett, the wisdom and practicality of a commission strategy came down to several test questions:

Was there a serious social challenge warranting a Commission? Was it in the national interest? Was there anyone else working on the issue? Did the foundation have the resources in budget and staff time to spend on such a project? And most importantly, was there a committed client or clients – political, financial, or ideally both – who wanted the work of a commission, would support its results, and had the muscle it to make it go?¹⁰

THE EARLY YEARS OF EDUCATIONAL AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING: 1920s—1960s

The Dominance of Commercial Broadcasting in the U.S.

In contrast to the course of radio and television development in many European countries, American broadcasting developed primarily in the commercial sector. Since radio’s beginnings in the 1920s, and as reinforced by the 1934 Communications Act, the U.S. federal government had supported privatization. In general, the government provided broadcasting licenses to for-profit companies, which sold advertising time to generate revenue to cover production and distribution costs and deliver profit to station owners and the corporate networks.¹¹ Programming choices, then, were driven by the entertainment and informational content that would most appeal to audiences attractive to corporate advertisers. From the beginning, two

⁸Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Interview with Lloyd Morrisett, Nov. 4, 2005.

¹¹Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting, *A Public Trust: The Report of the Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting* (New York: Bantam Books, 1979) p. 33.

large corporations—CBS and NBC—dominated broadcasting airwaves and the market for advertising.¹² In 1941, CBS was split in two, its “Blue Network” becoming ABC.

Initial Growth of Educational Broadcasting

Through a confluence of local action and entrepreneurship, foundation involvement and support, and federal regulation, public broadcasting in the U.S. began to emerge on a small scale within the commercially controlled context. In fact, the government issued some of its first formal broadcasting licenses to educational institutions, including the University of Wisconsin (1917) and Latter Day Saints University (1921). Individual organizations, often universities, began launching radio stations that delivered educational programs, with ten percent of all radio broadcasters operated by educational institutions by 1923. In the 1920s, though legislation proposing full federal control of broadcasting was defeated in Congress, the 1927 Dill-White Radio Act affirmed the government’s regulatory role and authority to grant frequency licenses based on “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”

Debate continued, with private foundations weighing in, about whether educational broadcasting should be delivered by commercial stations or through reserved noncommercial channels. Advocating the former in 1930, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation funded the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education (NACRE), which promoted a “doctrine of cooperation” between educators and commercial broadcasters, who, eager to avoid regulation and loss of market share, promised educational airtime on their stations. In contrast, the Payne Fund, a small foundation financed by a wealthy, progressive Republican heir to the Standard Oil fortune, funded the more radical National Committee on Education by Radio (NCER). Skeptical about commercial broadcasters’ commitment to public service, NCER pushed for designated educational channels and argued, “There has never been an example of mismanagement and lack of vision as colossal and far-reaching in its consequences as our turning the radio channels almost exclusively into commercial hands.”¹³

1934 Communications Act

The 1934 Communications Act established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as a “permanent federal agency to regulate interstate and international communication by wire and radio.” Led by a bipartisan mix of seven commissioners, the FCC facilitated the systematic development of U.S. broadcasting by issuing licenses, allocating frequencies, and studying new uses of broadcasting.

An amendment calling for reallocation of frequencies and proposing that a fourth of all radio stations be nonprofit was defeated, in part because of an unresolved debate in Congress over whether such stations could sell advertising. A clause was added requiring the FCC to evaluate the designation of channels to nonprofits. However, because the 1934 Communications Act did not address public broadcasting in a significant way, the commercial system became increasingly powerful, first in radio and then in television. Because of a lack of broadcasting expertise, disappointing listener interest, and Great Depression financial troubles, 164 of the 202 licenses obtained by educational institutions from 1921 to 1936 had either expired or been transferred to commercial stations by 1937.

Increasing Government and Foundation Support

¹²Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989) pp: 222-223.

¹³John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (Washington DC: Current: The Public Telecommunications Newspaper, 2000) pp: 1-10.

Over the next three decades, however, interest in and support for educational broadcasting would again expand. In 1938, the FCC officially reserved a small number of radio frequency channels for educational use. In 1940 and again in 1945, the government expanded support for public radio, setting aside 20 of the 100 existing FM radio frequencies for noncommercial and educational users. Under pressure from the public and from educational groups, the FCC in 1952 added 242 noncommercial television channels (out of 2,053 new allocations), to be licensed to educational institutions and, increasingly, nonprofit community organizations.

In 1949, the Rockefeller Foundation funded a conference of American, Canadian, and British educational broadcasters. The Ford Foundation played a key role in the 1950's and early 1960's by supporting legal assistance for the champions of educational broadcasting and by funding the distribution of educational television programs through its Fund for Adult Education, its Fund for the Advancement of Education, and the Educational Television and Radio Center. (See Exhibit 1 for a summary of Ford's funding of educational broadcasting.)

THE GREAT SOCIETY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CLIMATE OF THE 1960S

Along with significant political and social change during the 1960s came a call for expanded government investment in educational broadcasting. Democratic President John Kennedy's New Frontier inspired idealism in many Americans and support for government solutions – such as the Peace Corps – to social challenges in America and abroad. Upon Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, vice president and former senatorial leader Lyndon Johnson became president.

After working to stabilize the nation and assure continuation of Kennedy's agenda, Johnson in his first State of the Union message called for a war on poverty and the creation of a "Great Society." A friendly Congress awaited on Capitol Hill. At the time, Democrats enjoyed two-thirds majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Johnson declared, "We have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but toward the Great Society that demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time."

To this end, Johnson proposed expansion of the federal government's role in domestic policy. During LBJ's administration (1963-1969), Congress enacted two major civil rights acts (1964, 1965), the Economic Opportunity Act (1964), elementary and secondary education acts (1965), and two housing acts (1965, 1968). In addition, legislation was passed that created Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), Medicaid, and Medicare. During LBJ's first year in office, programs to fight the "War on Poverty" were the most visible pieces of legislation to emerge from Congress in response to the president's agenda. It created Community Action Agencies to empower the poor to find solutions to their housing, job, education, health, and community service problems. It also provided grants for the early-education program Head Start, the youth employment program Job Corps, and other work-training initiatives. Reelected by a landslide in November 1964, the Johnson went on to spearhead the more than 400 separate pieces of Great Society legislation enacted between 1964 and 1968.

Many Americans benefited from Great Society initiatives. But though these programs made significant contributions to the protection of civil rights and the expansion of social programs, critics increasingly complained that the antipoverty programs were ineffective and wasteful. The economic and political costs of the escalation of the Vietnam War (1959-1975), as well as the costs of the programs themselves, soon overtook Johnson's domestic initiatives. By 1967 Johnson was having difficulty sustaining popular support for the Great Society agenda. His popularity declined during fierce national debate, unrest, and protest over U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Critics of Great Society programs complained that they had grown too fast, created large bureaucracies, were fragmented, were difficult to implement, and gave the federal government undue influence in local affairs. In March 1968, Johnson announced that he would not seek the Democratic Party's nomination for president in the fall election (which conservative Republican Richard Nixon would win) and would instead focus his remaining presidency on ending the Vietnam War.

It was in the context of Johnson's Great Society that the initiative to create a system of federally funded public television stations emerged.

CREATING A PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM IN THE 1960S

The "Vast Wasteland" and the Call for Expanded Educational Broadcasting

Programmatically, radio and television broadcasting in the early 1960s remained dominated by commercial interests. The National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) and other advocates of public television argued that commercial programming was superficial, lacked excellence, and failed to fulfill the potential of the broadcast media to elevate and democratize the educational and cultural life of the nation. Although the FCC generally avoided confrontation with – indeed bowed under pressure from – corporate broadcasters, FCC Chairman Newton Minow challenged the National Association of Broadcasters in a 1961 speech that argued for balanced programming and increased educational broadcasting by commercial stations:

As a representative of the public, your health and your product are among my chief concerns. I have confidence in your health – but not in your product. I am here to uphold and protect the public interest. What do we mean by "the public interest?" Some say the public interest is merely what interests the public. I disagree.

When television is good, nothing--not the theater, not the magazines or newspapers--nothing is better. But when television is bad, nothing is worse. I invite you to sit down in front of your television set when your station goes on the air...and keep your eyes glued to that set until the station signs off. I can assure you that you will observe a vast wasteland.

You will see a procession of game shows, violence, audience-participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western badmen, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons. And, endlessly, commercials--many screaming, cajoling and offending. And most of all, boredom. True, you will see a few things you will enjoy. But they will be very, very few. And if you think I exaggerate, try it.¹⁴

The speech became a rallying cry for major change.

Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962

A federally funded national system of educational television stations had first been proposed to then-Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson in 1956 by Leonard Marks, an attorney who

¹⁴*Chicago Tribune*, reprinted April 24, 2001, p.17.

represented both the NAEB and Mrs. Johnson's personal broadcasting interests.¹⁵ Supportive, Johnson asked Senate Commerce Committee chairman Warren Magnuson (D-WA) to hold hearings and sponsor a bill to establish a system. The legislative effort stalled, however, and by 1960, due to funding that remained inadequate despite the Ford Foundation's substantial grantmaking, only 49 of the 257 educational television station licenses were in use. After significant education and lobbying by Marks and the NAEB, in 1962 Congress finally passed the Educational Television Facilities Act.

Facilitated by Johnson and signed by President John F. Kennedy, the ETV Facilities Act began the first flow of direct federal funding to educational television stations. Administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), \$32 million in matching grants for capital investment in equipment and facilities increased the number of educational television stations in operation or under construction by the mid-1960s to 189.¹⁶

Insufficient Financing

Still, educational broadcasters lacked sustainable revenue for programming and operations. Financing had been a challenge to educational broadcasting for decades and included debates over advertising use and government funding. By the "mid-1960's, public broadcasting was financed by a combination of state and local taxes, philanthropy, some program underwriting [sponsorships], and institutional budgets. Because this mosaic did not provide enough money to develop a major broadcasting service, public broadcasters paid increasing attention to the problem of long-range financing."¹⁷

In 1963 a reorganized NAEB created an Educational Television Stations division under the leadership of C. Scott Fletcher, former head of the Ford Foundation's Fund for Adult Education. Fletcher focused on "establishing an educational television program exchange service and exploring long-range financing for educational broadcasting." With a small grant from the U.S. Office of Education and a letter of endorsement from President Johnson, Fletcher launched the First National Conference on Long-Range Financing of Educational Television Stations, to be held in late 1964.

THE QUESTION OF A COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING

For the 1964 National Conference on Long-Range Financing of Educational Television Stations, WGBH-Boston General Manager Hartford Gunn, Assistant General Manager David Ives, and Boston's civic leader Ralph Lowell envisioned and prepared a proposal that Lowell would present at the conference. David Ives contacted Carnegie senior officer Art Singer. They discussed the potential for a Carnegie-sponsored commission.

Singer knew that Carnegie did not have the resources to directly fund a national system of public broadcasting stations, so that approach was not an option. Interested in what sort of leverage a commission might exert, Singer spoke with the White House's Douglass Cater, Special Assistant to the President for Education. Cater noted that the First Lady held television properties in Texas and that he and Johnson were uneasy about perceived conflicts of interest that could arise with a presidential commission. Cater agreed to discuss further with Johnson the

¹⁵John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 29-55.

¹⁶John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (DC: Current: Public Telecom. Newspaper, 2000) pp: 1-10.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 49.

option of a commission.¹⁸ Convinced of the need for a commission, Johnson conferred with a range of advisors on the question about what kind to endorse. The existence of a large number of active, federally funded presidential commissions (eight under Health, Education, and Welfare alone) was one argument for a privately funded commission.¹⁹

Art Singer knew that “unless commissions were formed in response to an urgent crisis, they, especially presidential commissions, had a reputation of requiring a lot of work that often resulted in a report’s collecting dust on a shelf.”²⁰ But because of the White House’s apparent interest and the politically receptive environment, Singer proposed a Carnegie-sponsored commission to Carnegie Corporation President John Gardner, who “immediately backed the idea.” If they were to make the decision to proceed however, they would require further discussion and formal approval of the Carnegie Corporation board of trustees, as well as endorsement from the White House.

Gardner understood that the Ford Foundation had long dominated educational television funding. He ensured that Ford president Harry Heald was contacted to confirm that such a study would not be interpreted as an attempt to invade Ford’s territory. Heald, on the contrary, expressed his belief that, given Ford’s entrenched interests in the field, a Carnegie study would be perceived as a more objective voice and might therefore carry greater weight in public opinion. Heald agreed that Carnegie should take the lead.²¹

National Conference on Long-Range Financing of Educational Television Stations – 1964

At the late 1964 conference, FCC Chairman E. William Henry called for the group to “find ways to make the medium serve one of its highest and most natural uses – as a means of eliminating cultural poverty – of making knowledge and enlightenment, culture and beauty, stimulation and controversy available to everyone. . . .” In a statement prepared with WGBH General Manager Hartford Gunn and Assistant General Manager David Ives, Boston’s Ralph Lowell advocated the establishment of a commission to recommend a national public policy for educational television.²²

The conference produced eight mandates for the growth and direction of educational television, the last and most important of which stated, “Immediate attention should be given to the appointment of a Presidential Commission to make recommendations for educational television development, after intensive study of a year or more duration.” In the final conference session, Fletcher urged dropping his original plan for a White House Conference and going “directly to a Commission, whether it is public, private, presidentially financed or otherwise.”²³

Also in early 1965, Senator Warren Magnuson (D-WA), the Senate Commerce Committee chairman who had championed the 1962 ETV Facilities act, made a case for federal aid to public broadcasting in his *Educational Television Progress Report* to President Johnson. (See Exhibit 2.)

A Decision for the Carnegie Corporation

¹⁸Interview with Arthur Singer, Jan. 6, 2005.

¹⁹John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 102.

²⁰Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

²¹John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 102.

²²John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 68-94.

²³Ibid, p. 92.

The Carnegie Corporation's staff and board leadership faced a strategic decision. Should Carnegie convene a commission or not? If not, what were the other options for Carnegie to play a leadership role on the issue of educational broadcasting? If a commission was warranted, would a public or private commission be best?

If they proceeded with a Carnegie Commission, what were the obstacles to be overcome? What were the opportunities and risks of a commission? Could they succeed?

What outcome was desired for public broadcasting? What were the alternatives to the kind of system a commission seemed likely to recommend?

Other key questions centered on people and process. Who should serve on the committee, lead it, and staff it? Should the recommendations of the Commission be allowed to emerge organically, or should officers at Carnegie and the Commission's staff set up and guide the Commission to produce a predetermined desired result?

Exhibit 1

Ford Foundation grants and expenditures for educational broadcasting, fiscal years 1951-68

The Ford Foundation was public television's first big funder, supporting efforts to acquire reserved channels, helping to start stations in major cities, and backing National Educational Television, the system's major production and distribution organization in its early years.

Ford Foundation grants and expenditures for educational television and radio projects

Fiscal year	TV and radio	Television	Radio
1951	1,439,091	946,291	492,800
1952	2,646,106	2,646,106	0
1953	4,490,021	4,339,116	150,905
1954	4,776,068	4,776,068	0
1955	3,139,195	3,139,195	0
1956	9,979,675	9,979,675	0
1957	4,749,720	4,674,970	74,750
1958	3,965,932	3,765,932	200,000
1959	11,126,112	11,113,512	12,600
1960	7,708,701	7,707,201	1,500
1961	8,140,359	8,125,359	15,000
1962	19,580,006	19,580,006	0
1963	7,423,652	7,423,652	0
1964	7,560,522	7,560,522	0
1965	7,171,903	7,171,903	0

1966	16,288,700	16,288,700	0
1967	23,000,544	22,962,544	38,000
1968	10,998,411	10,961,911	36,500

Source: *Ford Foundation Activities in Noncommercial Broadcasting, 1951-1976*. New York: Ford Foundation, 1976. Retrieved from <http://www.fordfound.org/elibrary/documents/0303/normal/low/0303norm-low.pdf>.

Exhibit 2

Excerpts from “Educational Television: Progress Report”

Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, laid out the case for federal aid to public broadcasting in this report, entered in the *Congressional Record* as an "extension of remarks" on October 22, 1965:

“Educational Television: Progress Report”

The educational establishment in this country has been struggling since 1945 to keep up with new techniques and developments in communication. Still, the situation in American education is critical: numbers of students continue to increase at all levels while the number of qualified teachers is not increasing at the same rate. In addition, the amount of information to be taught grows almost daily requiring almost continuous curriculum changes. . . . Thus, we must consider education as we do advertising, entertainment and manufacturing, in that the distribution must be efficient. For at least part of our educational effort we are forced to think of the mass media, the most potent of which is television.

The use of television in education is about 12 years old. Today there are slightly more than 100 educational television stations on the air, and it is expected that there will be 130 by the end of 1966. . . . The most pervasive of these educational television signals comes from the broadcasting stations, which are Federal licensees, charged with meeting community needs. Of the 105 stations on the air, about 20 are owned by school systems. These stations are supported to a large degree by local boards of education, and more than 60 percent of the programming is designed specifically for classrooms. More than a dozen stations are owned by States, or State ETV authorities, and are committed not only to programs for schools, but also to the education and enlightenment of audiences at home. Several States have interconnected their stations, and now operate educational television networks. Almost 35 stations are operated by universities, some of which also make use of closed circuit systems.

In more than 30 communities, corporations have been formed for the specific purpose of owning and operating educational television stations. The boards of directors are local businessmen, industrialists, educators, public officers, and prominent citizens. These are cooperative educational ventures, committed entirely to the communities in which they operate, and are called community stations. Examples are WQED in Pittsburgh, KTCA in Minneapolis, WGBH in Boston, WTTW in Chicago and KQED in San Francisco.

Educational television programs are produced and distributed to stations by only a few agencies. National Educational Television in New York, which has been supported heavily since 1953 by the Ford Foundation, produces the bulk of ETV's cultural and public affairs programs. These are mailed from station to station. . . . Educational Television Stations, a division of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, has recently developed the ETS program service, a second source of general programming for stations. This will be, basically, an exchange system whereby programs produced at local ETV stations are made available to others across the country. . . .

The Federal Government has not only been aware of the growth of educational television, but has also assisted, through several important pieces of legislation. The National Defense Education Act provides for experimentation in the use of new media, and in the past 7 years more than \$8 million has been obligated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

for studying, planning, and reporting about ETV. Beyond this, almost 40 contracts have been awarded under Title VII for the dissemination of information about the use of television in teaching.

The Educational Television Facilities Act, Public Law 87-447, has made possible direct Federal support for educational television stations. Grants have been made since 1962, on a matching basis with States, for development of new stations and for the expansion of existing facilities. Almost 100 applications have been accepted for filing. . . . The growth of educational television has been reassuring over the past decade, and the rate of expansion is increasing. Half of the stations on the air today were activated subsequent to 1960.

Private foundations have been committed quite heavily over the years to educational television. Between 1950 and 1960 the Fund for Adult Education, an independent agency established by the Ford Foundation, gave more than \$12 million to ETV, after playing a major role in the very beginning of the movement. Since 1960, the Ford Foundation has continued to demonstrate a deep interest in the future of ETV, for which the entire country is very thankful. Other foundations have come to the assistance of stations -- at both local and national levels -- without which, in some cases, the stations might not have survived.

The educational television station is an instrument that has proven to be useful and powerful. More and better use of it must be made, but is there a single role for television in education? If we were free to mold local and national educational television into whatever shape we pleased, what could we choose? Some would insist that educational television must be built as part of formal education, making its services aim primarily at the needs of school and classrooms. There are those who would argue that . . . facilities are available for schools and that educational television station programming should provide "alternate viewing" for American television audiences, offering a steady stream of cultural and informational programs for those who wish to view. Still others would tell us that the value of educational television lies in its ability to reach minority groups in need of specialized training. Continuing adult education, they would insist, is the area on which ETV must concentrate. Literacy programs, series for the socially neglected, extension courses for professionals in the community and programs in foreign languages should be the work of educational television.

The needs of American education, however, transcend any single philosophy for educational television. ETV must become as many things as possible, depending, in each instance, on the needs of the community and the needs of the station. There can be no single philosophy for educational television, and it is diversity itself—among stations—that will strengthen the national effort. Educational television must become a service; its properties and goals should change from day to day to day and from city to city. . . .

Educational television stations have no firm financial base on which to operate. The United States is unique in the world because its commercial broadcasting system is a giant in comparison with its educational and information service. We have been careful to define what educational television stations may not do, but we have not clearly described methods by which they may support themselves and expand. Television is as expensive as it is useful, and I do not believe we can expect noncommercial educational licensees to exist without a basic financial structure. This is not to propose Federal support for all of educational television, but it is to suggest that we examine the areas in which the Federal Government can assist, as we have assisted in elementary, secondary and higher education, vocational rehabilitation, and other specialized fields.

Continuity of growth must be assured. Educational television has passed through two important phases. The first included the establishment of a few stations, and the recognition of ETV as an instrumentality of importance. The second was the activation of many stations across the country. . . . The next phase for ETV is that of expansion. The agencies and foundations that

have supported the movement from the start will, it is hoped, continue to contribute. . . . Networking in the sense of actual interconnection will change during the next number of years from being statewide or regional to national. Interconnection among educational television stations is essential, if the medium is to provide the national service of which it is capable. Efforts are being made now toward this linkage.

For the stations themselves, the costs are prohibitive, but the advantages of a network are such that ways must be found to support the operation.

Additional stations must be activated across the country. . . . 40 percent of the country's population is not within reach of an educational signal. . . . Sources must be tapped to stimulate smaller communities toward the establishment of local ETV stations. I believe the FCC was wise in July of this year when it developed a new allocations plan calling for more than 600 ETV reservations.

Educational television must be stimulated to produce a continuously better product. The outcome of education is the enlightenment of citizens; the output of any broadcasting service is its programs. Therefore, it is the mission of educational television to produce and distribute enlightening programs. Since there is intense competition among broadcasters for the attention of viewers, it is clear that ETV programs must be nothing short of excellent. Because of stringent budgets, ETV programs have hardly reached this level.

Instructional libraries and program centers must be nurtured for the good of all ETV stations.

The Educational Television Facilities Act has now been operating for a period of 3 years. Its 5-year period will expire in the next Congress. What has been the impact of this act on the development of educational television? Should the ceiling limitation of \$1 million to one State be raised? Should the matching funds formula be modified? Should the formula pertaining to interconnection costs be changed so as to encourage the early development of a nationwide interconnected educational television system?

It is my intention to have a full examination made of this entire subject matter in the very near future. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Federal Communications Commission, the two agencies charged with the administrative responsibility of the Educational Television Facilities Act, will be asked to submit their views and recommendations. I am hopeful that all individuals and groups interested in educational television will put their minds to work on this subject so that a meaningful analysis and appropriate action can be taken to assure the continued expansion and development of this significant service to the public.

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Educational Television Progress Report, Sen. Warren Magnuson, 1965." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/legislation/ETVProgressRept1965.html>.

The Carnegie Corporation and Public Broadcasting (Part B)

THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION: LAUNCH, MEMBERSHIP, AND APPROACH

With Arthur Singer's support, John Gardner raised the issue of a Carnegie commission as an "unscheduled item" at a Carnegie board of trustees' executive committee meeting in April 1965. Gardner argued that the situation called for a nonpolitical commission that was privately funded, could generate progressive recommendations, and carried the credibility and nonpartisan political influence required to change the system, most likely through new federal policy and institutions. The board discussed how Carnegie was uniquely positioned because of its demonstrated power to convene influential thought leaders from across sectors and because a larger role in promoting educational broadcasting aligned with the Corporation's mission to "advance and diffuse knowledge and understanding among the people of the United States." Convinced, Carnegie's board gave unanimous approval to support the Commission. Carnegie decided to fund the project directly, with a \$500,000 grant to finance the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television.²⁴

Following the 1964 Educational Television Stations Conference, Scott Fletcher had asked Ralph Lowell to chair a committee to develop a proposal encouraging President Johnson to establish a commission. Composed of business and university leaders who served on educational station boards, Lowell Committee members were selected for their "visibility to the President as well as their outstanding contributions to education and broadcasting. The committee met in the spring of 1965, with Scott Fletcher, Hartford Gunn, and David Ives in attendance. In a proposal sent to the White House in June 1965, the committee recommended a privately financed, rather than a presidential, commission.²⁵

With the White House already in deep discussion with Carnegie about a private commission, President Johnson formally endorsed the launch of the Carnegie Commission. As John Gardner later recalled, "The Lowell-Gunn-Ives combination gets credit for surfacing the idea, and from there on it was Art Singer entrepreneurship all the way, with Doug Cater [at the White House] and myself facilitating."²⁶

An influential factor was Carnegie's strong relationship with the Johnson Administration. John Gardner had been a close and trusted advisor to Lyndon Johnson on education issues. Later in 1965, Gardner joined President Johnson's cabinet as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. (Alan Pifer would become the Carnegie's acting and then full president.) Johnson and Gardner shared a partnership that was critical to the positioning of the Commission and the development of public broadcasting. As Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to President Johnson, would later remember, "They both came together when each was at the peak of their powers – Gardner at the peak of his intellectual power and Johnson at the peak of his political power. It was a very forceful combination of talent, intellect, and timing that made for a terrific one-two

²⁴Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989) p. 224.

²⁵Ibid. pp: 95-98.

²⁶Letter from John Gardner, May 16, 1991 (Arthur Singer archives).

punch. The fact that the Carnegie Commission had John Gardner's personal stamp on it, gave it force with LBJ that it wouldn't have had with anyone else."²⁷

Recruiting Commission Members

Acting as liaison between Carnegie and the Commission, Arthur Singer began working to identify candidates to recommend to President Johnson. What types of members would generate the best ideas? What groups should be represented? Who would be most effective at championing recommendations to stakeholders on Capitol Hill, in the broadcasting industry, and elsewhere? Who would play the key role of chairman? What staffing would be required? The first step to assembling the Commission was to recruit a leader to chair it. Officers at Carnegie recommended that MIT chairman James R. Killian, Jr., a political independent, serve as chair. Reflecting the need for bipartisan leadership, Leonard Marks explained that "no one would question his objectivity and dedication to the best interests of American education."²⁸ Singer added:

First, [Killian] had been president and chairman of the world's leading technical university. Second, he had a broad acquaintance among the country's scientists and engineers, and they universally respected him. Third, and perhaps most important, he had been summoned by President Eisenhower to Washington after the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in 1957. He organized the President's Science Advisory Committee to advise the government on a broad range of scientific and technical issues. In this role he dealt with many agencies and committees of Congress. . . . [H]e knew his way around Washington. Since . . . a successful commission had to be linked to the political powers that would deal with its recommendations, Killian seemed like an ideal choice for chairman. Gardner invited him; he accepted; and, in the end, we could not have done better.²⁹

Leonard Marks, Douglass Cater, and others from the White House advised on and approved the list. Their only direct requirement was that J. C. Kellam, a Texan and close associate of LBJ, be included. The membership comprised a mix of leaders in education, media, business, labor, broadcasting, and the arts. Known and respected by Johnson, their reputations and networks would likely generate political and public support for the Commission's ultimate recommendations. Among others, Killian, Singer, and Stephen White did the recruiting. The final 15-member Commission included:

- **James B. Conant**, Former president, Harvard University; conducting studies for Carnegie on education
- **Lee A. DuBridge**, president, California Institute of Technology
- **Ralph Ellison**, author
- **John S. Hayes**, U.S. ambassador to Switzerland; former chair, Democratic National Committee
- **David D. Henry**, president, University of Illinois
- **Oveta Culp Hobby**, chairman of the board, Houston Post Company
- **James R. Killian, Jr.**, commission chairman; chairman of the Corporation, MIT

²⁷*Uncommon American: John Gardner*, video documentary (20th Century Fox, 2000).

²⁸John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 103-109.

²⁹Arthur Singer, *The Origins of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television* (personal memoir, 2005).

- **J. C. Kellam**, President, Texas Broadcasting Corporation (owned by Lyndon and Ladybird Johnson)
- **Edwin H. Land**, president, Polaroid Corporation
- **Joseph H. McConnell**, president, Reynolds Metals Company
- **Franklin Patterson**, president, Hampshire College
- **Terry Sanford**, former governor of North Carolina
- **Robert Saudek**, Robert Saudek Associates, Inc.
- **Rudolph Serkin**, concert pianist
- **Leonard Woodcock**, vice president, United Automobile Workers of America

In addition, Arthur Singer “visited the three heads of the commercial networks to see that they were comfortable. . . [with the Commission]. They were. It appeared that they favored a separate public broadcasting system because it would take the heat off of them to offer educational programming.”³⁰

Approach of the Carnegie Commission

Very early on, Arthur Singer recruited Stephen White from CBS to join the staff, because Singer “considered him the most knowledgeable, imaginative – indeed, brilliant – person on this topic . . . [and] a writer of huge talent.”³¹ Lloyd Morrisett, Vice President of Programs at Carnegie at this time, later recalled that “the character and motivation of the key actors make a big difference in success or failure. In addition to Art Singer, Doug Cater at the White House and Stephen White at the Commission played defining roles.” The Commission was based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and staffed under its Executive Secretary, Dr. Hyman Goldin, who had been involved in educational television as former head of the FCC’s Research and Education Division.

Charged with “conducting a broadly conceived study of noncommercial television,” Goldin said that the “main objective was to develop a policy position rather than an analytical or research paper.” Beginning in early 1966, the commission over the next 14 months conducted statistical surveys of educational stations and networks, reviewed literature on educational television, “held eight formal full meetings, received testimony from 225 individuals, and visited 92 educational TV stations in 35 states” as well as “England, Japan, Canada, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Sweden.” While input was elicited from a range of stakeholders (including the NAEB; the FCC; HEW; and Carnegie itself), care was taken to preserve the integrity and objectivity of the study.^{32, 33}

From the beginning, Singer and White held clear views on what some outcomes should be. For Singer, the goal was to “get the federal government into the act. But, we did not want to create a fourth network. Localism, local stations as the source of programming, was important to our agenda.” Several decisions were in actuality driven by Commission or Carnegie Corporation staff, while others came from Commission members. Working closely with Singer, White wrote position papers on policy questions. Singer recounted, “White wrote what resembled a legal brief that presented both sides of the question about whether to include classroom-based instructional television or instead focus only on ‘prime-time’ public television. We strongly favored the latter,

³⁰Ibid, and Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989) p. 225.

³³John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 110-115.

and although his brief appeared to be objective and balanced, it clearly led the Commission to the decision we were looking for.”³⁴

To build political support, Singer and White sought to generate a proposal with “no surprises” for Congressional leaders required to pass legislation. “Senators Warren Magnuson [D-WA] and John Pastore [D-RI] were key powers in Congress,” said Singer, “so Chairman Killian kept them informed all the way through. Through Doug Cater, I kept the White House staff involved as we developed recommendations and LBJ’s man on the commission, Kellam, kept the President informed.”³⁵

CARNEGIE COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Through its study, the Commission probed several main policy issues: the need for increased programming and funding; concerns about political influence; views on classroom instructional broadcasting versus public service broadcasting; and the degree of interconnection, centralization, and integration among stations in the system.³⁶ Addressed to the American people but aimed at Washington, the Commission’s 112-page report, *Public Television: A Program for Action*, was released in January 1967. This “Proposal to Extend and Strengthen Educational Television” “articulated a new and broader mission for noncommercial broadcasting.”

. . . A well-financed and well-directed educational television system, substantially larger and far more pervasive and effective than that which now exists in the U.S., must be brought into being if the full needs of the American public are to be served. . . . The programs we conceive to be the essence of Public Television are in general not . . . for commercial sponsorship, are not designed for the classroom, and are directed at audiences ranging from the tens of thousands to the occasional tens of millions. No such system now exists to serve us as model. . . .

Although it provides for immediate assistance to existing stations, this is a proposal not for small adjustments or patchwork changes, but for a comprehensive system that will ultimately bring Public Television to all the people of the U.S.: a system that in its totality will become a new and fundamental institution in American culture. . . . It is not the educational television that we now know; it is not patterned after the commercial system or the British or Japanese system. . . . We propose an indigenous American system arising out of our own traditions and responsive to our own needs. . . . Public Television is capable of becoming the clearest expression of American diversity, and of excellence within that diversity. . . .

Accordingly, the Commission submits . . . recommendations for the consideration of the people of the United States, their government, and those who for two decades have created and sustained the various institutions that constitute educational television.

The Commission “separated educational television into two parts, (1) *instructional* television, directed at students in the classroom or otherwise in formal education, and (2) *public* television, directed at the general community to provide enrichment and information.” Excluding

³⁴Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting, *A Public Trust: The Report of the Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting* (New York: Bantam Books, 1979) p. 35.

instructional television, viewed as unproven, caused debate because instructional television had helped “sell” the 1962 ETV Facilities Act. Radio broadcasting was also excluded from the recommendations.

The Commission went on to deliver 12 recommendations, the most important of which called for legislation that (1) increased federal funding for technology, programming, and operations and (2) created a private, nonprofit organization, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), to receive and disburse funds for, coordinate programming of, and deflect political influence on public television.³⁷ The idea of a buffer organization between government and stations came not from the staff but from Commissioner Terry Sanford.³⁸ See **Exhibit 3** for the Commission’s recommendations.

On the issue of central control vs. local autonomy, the Commission struck a balance intended to interconnect and rationalize the distribution of programming, while protecting the authority of local stations to choose and produce programming that resonated with local communities.

The Commission recommended two controversial strategies for funding public broadcasting while insulating it from undue government pressure or political influence. Only half of the Corporation’s 12-member governing board would be appointed by the President (with Senate approval), with the other six chose by the appointees themselves.

It was proposed that federal funding be generated from a new excise tax on the sales of television sets, common in other nations, rather than from federal appropriations that might be jeopardized by politics. This idea came from Commission members themselves, and although Singer and White did not expect Congress to approve, they supported the idea’s inclusion. The Commission projected that the Corporation “would need \$104 million a year to fund public broadcasting’s programming, interconnection, and related functions . . . and by the 1960’s . . . the public television system would require a total of \$270 million a year, including \$75 million from non-federal sources. The Commission also called on the government to fund equipment and station operations.”³⁹ The Commission retained consulting firm Arthur D. Little to analyze costs and develop economic models. According to Goldin, initial projections of the full long-range costs of public broadcasting generated numbers that were not politically realistic. Consequently, the Commission produced final projections and funding requirements that arguably underestimated the ultimate cost of the system.⁴⁰

Alternative Financing Models

Debate about financing had arisen during the Commission’s work. Early on, members agreed that increased federal funding of programming would be necessary, but they were concerned about political support. Reynolds Metal President Joseph McConnell disagreed with the proposal for a television set excise tax:

I cannot completely concur in the recommendation for the imposition of an excise tax. I quite agree that if Public Television is to be financed in major part by the federal government, it would be highly desirable to avoid year-to-year appropriations by Congress. The political implications of these are apparent. I suggest that those who

³⁷Public Broadcasting Policy Base (A service of Current Publishing Committee and the National Public Broadcasting Archives), *Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, 1967* (Web page created Oct. 16, 1999).

³⁸Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

³⁹John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (Washington DC: Current: The Public Telecommunications Newspaper, 2000) pp: 45-55.

⁴⁰John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 122-123.

are licensed to use the airways in the “public interest” – the [commercial] television stations – should at least share in the cost of Public Television.⁴¹

The Commission did not pursue other financing ideas emerging at the time. The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting commissioned New York University economist Dick Netzer to issue a *Long-Range Financing of Public Broadcasting* report, which recommended revenue sources from taxes or government fees:

- Taxes on gross receipts of commercial radio and TV broadcasters [at 4%, would yield \$120M annually],
- Taxes on all FCC long-distance communications licenses,
- Taxes on total television advertising outlays,
- Taxes on broadcasters’ net profits,
- Taxes on broadcasters’ excess profits,
- Charges for leasing access to the radio frequency spectrum [projected to yield \$50M annually],
- A flat per-household radio-TV license fee, and
- A manufacturers’ excise tax on TV sets.⁴²

Netzer also recommended that public broadcasting receive “non-governmental financing by establishing the Ford Foundation’s proposed nonprofit satellite system . . . estimated to yield \$20 million a year as well as the substantial value of free interconnection services.” In August 1966, Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy had called for establishing “a nonprofit corporation that would provide, through a series of fixed satellites, national interconnection for all television in the U.S., commercial and educational.” Through a shared technology resource, educational stations would gain free distribution and receive two thirds of the commercial networks’ savings.

Realizing the Commission’s Recommendations: The Prospects for Legislation

Now that the Commission had produced its report, it reflected on its work and sought to determine its role going forward. Had the commission generated the right solution for public broadcasting? Which of their proposals were secure and which at risk? What tactics would best ensure that the Commission’s recommendations became a reality?

One source of support came from the educational broadcasting industry itself. In December 1966, Scott Fletcher chaired the Second National Conference on Long-Range Financing of Educational Television Stations to review an early copy of the Carnegie Commission’s recommendations. Emphasizing the political importance of a united voice, the stations produced a consensus statement of support for the Commission’s proposal and called for legislation to be passed. The commercial broadcasting industry, unconcerned about competition and eager to loosen government requirements for educational broadcast time, also supported the expansion of a separate public broadcasting industry.

Politically, Carnegie knew that the control Democrats enjoyed in the White House and through two-thirds majorities in Congress was an important advantage. But despite their advance work with congressional leaders such as Democratic Senators Magnuson and Pastore, the Commission knew there would be differing views on legislation. The source and scale of long-

⁴¹John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 120-121.

⁴²John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (Washington DC: Current: The Public Telecommunications Newspaper, 2000) pp: 50.

range financing could become a major issue on Capitol Hill. Because both conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats might view the Corporation for Public Broadcasting as federal overinvolvement in private, local activities, securing consensus and the two-thirds majority required to pass legislation was not a sure thing. President Johnson clearly supported expanding public broadcasting legislation, and as a former U.S. representative and effective Senate minority and majority leader, he was a master of congressional influence and politics. However, Carnegie also recognized that Johnson was pragmatic and prone to compromise in order to pass legislation, especially in the context of his other legislative priorities and the growing conflict in Vietnam.

Assessing public opinion, Carnegie understood that the social welfare and education policies and programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had generally been well received by Americans in the early and mid-1960s. However, because the intricacies of the public broadcasting system and policy issues were technical and complex, the public might not easily understand or rally in support of the Commission's recommended legislation.

The Carnegie Corporation and the Commission strategized about next steps. After such a large investment of leadership, time, and resources, they were eager to ensure a successful outcome for public broadcasting. What would it take to establish political and public support for the new legislation and institutions that the Carnegie Commission recommended for the public broadcasting system?

Exhibit 3

Excerpt from *Public Television: A Program for Action*.

The Carnegie Commission released its report, *Public Television: A Program for Action*, on January 26, 1967. The following excerpts are from the report's summary:

*A Proposal to Extend and Strengthen Educational Television:
A Summary of the Commission's Report*

. . . [T]he Commission submits the following recommendations for the consideration of the people of the United States, their government, and those who for decades have created and sustained the various institutions that constitute educational television.

THE COMMISSION URGES IMMEDIATE ACTION TO EXTEND AND STRENGTHEN EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION

1. We recommend concerted efforts at the federal, state, and local levels to improve the facilities and to provide for the adequate support of the individual educational television stations and to increase their number. . . .

THE COMMISSION PROPOSES A NEW INSTITUTION FOR PUBLIC TELEVISION

2. We recommend that Congress act promptly to authorize and to establish a federally chartered, nonprofit, nongovernmental corporation, to be known as the "Corporation for Public Television." The Corporation should be empowered to receive and disburse governmental and private funds in order to extend and improve Public Television programming. The Commission considers the creation of the Corporation fundamental to its proposal and would be most reluctant to recommend the other parts of its plan unless the corporate entity is brought into being. . . .

3. We recommend that the Corporation support at least two national production centers, and that it be free to contract with independent producers to prepare Public Television programs for educational television stations. . . .

4. We recommend that the Corporation support, by appropriate grants and contracts, the production of Public Television programs by local stations for more-than-local use. . . .

5. We recommend that the Corporation on appropriate occasions help support local programming by local stations. . . .

6. We recommend that the Corporation provide the educational television system as expeditiously as possible with facilities for live interconnection by conventional means, and that it be enabled to benefit from advances in technology as domestic communications satellites are brought into being. The Commission further recommends that Congress act to permit the granting of preferential rates for educational television for

the use of interconnection facilities, or to permit their free use, to the extent that this may not be possible under existing law. . . .

7. We recommend that the Corporation encourage and support research and development leading to the improvement of programming and program production. . . .

8. We recommend that the Corporation support technical experimentation designed to improve the present television technology. . . .

9. We recommend that the Corporation undertake to provide means by which technical, artistic, and specialized personnel may be recruited and trained. . . .

THE COMMISSION PROPOSES ENLARGED FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC TELEVISION

10. We recommend that Congress provide the federal funds required by the Corporation through a manufacturer's excise tax on television sets (beginning at 2 percent and rising to a ceiling of 5 percent). The revenues should be made available to the Corporation through a trust fund. . . .

11. We recommend new legislation to enable the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide adequate facilities for stations now in existence, to assist in increasing the number of stations to achieve nationwide coverage, to help support the basic operations of all stations, and to enlarge the support of instructional television programming. . . .

THE COMMISSION PROPOSES CONTINUING STUDY TO IMPROVE INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION

12. We recommend that federal, state, local, and private educational agencies sponsor extensive and innovative studies intended to develop better insights into the use of television in formal and informal education. . . .

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Summary, 1967." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/carnegie/CarnegieISummary.html>.

The Carnegie Corporation and Public Broadcasting (Part C)

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MANDATE AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A PUBLIC BROADCASTING BILL

In January 1967, after the Carnegie Commission discussed its proposal with the White House, President Lyndon Johnson remarked in his State of the Union address that “we should develop educational TV into a vital public resource to enrich our homes, educate our families, and assist in our classrooms. We should insist that the public interest be fully served through the public airwaves. I will propose these measures to the 90th Congress.”⁴³ In his February “Message on Education and Health,” Johnson again mandated policy, emphasizing the insufficient resources and unmet audience potential, remarking:

We want most of all to enrich man's spirit. That is the purpose of this act. It builds a new institution: the Corporation for Public Television. The Corporation will assist stations and producers who aim for the best in broadcasting. . . . It will try to prove that what educates can also be exciting. It will get part of its support from our Government. But it will be carefully guarded from Government or from party control. It will be free, independent, and will belong to all of our people.⁴⁴

At Carnegie, Art Singer hired a D.C. law firm to quickly convert the Commission's recommendations into a bill, noting, “We didn't just want to give Congress a report, we wanted to give them the legislation.” Jim Killian continued championing the effort. To garner political support, the Commission established a separate lobbying organization, “The Friends of Public Television,” and within 48 hours of the report's release published an accessible book version of the proposal to the public.⁴⁵

In March 1967, President Johnson and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare submitted a bill to Congress – the Public Television Act of 1967 – introduced by Senator Warren Magnuson (D-WA) and based in great part on the Commission's work. With \$9 million in initial seed money, the bill would establish a nonprofit “Corporation for Public Television.” The Corporation's fifteen-member board was to be appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and serve a six-year term. The bill called for increased federal support for station facilities. HEW was authorized to study instructional television. The President indicated that, after a year, he would make proposals for the Corporation's long-term financing.⁴⁶

Revisions to Carnegie's Recommendations

However, the bill diverged in important ways from Carnegie's recommendations. Johnson was interested only in submitting a bill that carried strong likelihood of passage, rather than risk disagreement on controversial proposals in open hearings. In general, “while the Carnegie Commission laid out a public television blueprint that emphasized programming, the legislation

⁴³John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 146.

⁴⁴Corporation for Public Broadcasting website (www.cpb.org/aboutpb/act/remarks.html, accessed 10/24/05)

⁴⁵Interview with Arthur Singer, Nov. 1, 2005.

⁴⁶Burke, pp: 147-149.

tackled the more basic questions of logistics and technology.”⁴⁷ Two key Carnegie recommendations were not politically viable and were cut from the bill that Johnson and HEW put forward. Viewed as regressive, the excise tax on TV sets would not be supported by legislators, the Budget Bureau, or the Treasury Department because of lack of control and concern that revenue would not match required funding. Because “appointments are a traditional and highly valued prerogative of the executive branch,”⁴⁸ they also rejected Carnegie’s proposal that half of the Corporation’s board be self-appointed. At Johnson’s direction, long-range financing was excluded because he and HEW anticipated lengthy analysis and complicated committee jurisdictional problems they wanted to side-step. Including long-range financing would have triggered the involvement of an ungainly total of four different committees in Congress.⁴⁹

Hearings and Debate in the Senate

Congressional hearings began in April 1967 with the Senate Commerce Committee. Favorable support came from all sectors and organizations testifying, including HEW, educational TV industry leaders, the FCC, the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities, McGeorge Bundy of the Ford Foundation, and Carnegie Commission members including Chair James Killian, Lee DuBridge, Leonard Woodcock, and Edwin Land, who offered particularly eloquent and compelling testimony. All three corporate network presidents testified in support of the bill, including Frank Stanton of CBS, who pledged \$1 million to the Corporation if the bill passed. Though network executives of this era were often more civic minded than those of later generations, they were eager to defer educational programming burdens to public stations and garner the public relations benefits of supporting the bill. Also in April, public radio advocates testified for the Act to create a public radio system, not included in Carnegie’s report. Opponents contended that doing so would divert funds from television. After debate, radio was included and the name of the bill changed to the *Public Broadcasting Act*.

Though supported by educational broadcasters, the Ford Foundation satellite proposal stalled in hearings. The discontinuation was due to the lack of a U.S. communications policy and to opposition from and prior agreements with corporate communications carriers, including AT&T, the quasi-military Communications Satellite Corporation, and Western Union. They and the commercial networks argued against taking profits from business to finance a nonprofit enterprise, especially one that conflicted with security communications interests during the Vietnam and Cold Wars. Preoccupied with getting the bill through, the Johnson deferred the larger communications policy to a 1968 White House task force. Because its findings were not produced until an uninterested Richard Nixon won the presidency, the task force “marks the last, greatest executive branch attempt to centralize control over American communications” and “one of the last thorough attempts to establish a sustainable, independent, and cheap delivery system for public broadcasting.” Timing was such that “public broadcasting was born during the awkward adolescence of American telecommunications.”⁵⁰

Reversing the Johnson proposal, the Senate Committee called for only nine Corporation board members to be appointed by the President and six by the appointees. The Committee’s version of the bill authorized \$10 million in 1968 and “such sums as would be necessary for 1969 through 1972.” The Committee reported that, beyond the initial funding, “much more

⁴⁷James Ledbetter, *Made Possible By...* (New York: Verson, 1997) pp. 27.

⁴⁸John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (Wash DC: Current: The Public Telecommunications Newspaper, 2000) pp: 14-19.

⁴⁹John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 154.

⁵⁰James Ledbetter, *Made Possible By...* (New York: Verson, 1997) pp. 34-35.

money would be required in future years” and quoted the President’s pledge to propose long-term financing within the year.

Senator John Pastore (D-RI) introduced the revised bill on the floor of the Senate. During floor debate, Senators Harry Byrd (D-VA) and William Proxmire (D-WI) raised questions about the bill, while Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) vigorously opposed it. Senators speaking in favor included Hugh Scott (R-PA), Charles Percy (R-IL), Jacob Javits (R-NY), Joseph Tydings (D-MD), Winston Prouty (R-VT), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA). With leadership from Senator Magnuson and cross-aisle support from Senate minority leader Norris Cotton (R-NH), the bill was approved and forwarded to the House.

Hearings and Debate in the House of Representatives

More opposition arose in the House. The bill was introduced by Congressman Harley Staggers (D-WV), chair of the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to hold hearings in July 1967. Many of the eighty witnesses had testified in the Senate, including James Killian, who argued that Japan, a much smaller nation, invested \$250 million annually in its public broadcasting system.

Meanwhile, “White House staff, the NAEB, HEW proponents, and other interested supporters” advanced a campaign to ensure passage in the House. Seeking to contain partisan politics, “the White House worked very closely with the NAEB to develop headcounts of members for, against, and on the fence, [as well as] ways in which they could be approached to support the legislation.”⁵¹

Conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats “viewed the bill with some distrust as a precedent for more federal interference in the media.” Representative William Springer (R-IL) warned of partisan influence on programming. In response, James Killian asked that the Senate “be much tougher and more careful in [Corporation board] confirmation procedures . . . than it might normally be . . .” remarking that the Commission “gave more attention . . . to this problem of independence than anything else.”⁵² In a political compromise, the committee added a controversial amendment stating that “no non-commercial educational broadcasting station may engage in editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate for political office,” but clarifying that it did not “preclude balanced, fair, and objective presentations of controversial issues by noncommercial stations.”⁵³

When briefed on the Carnegie Report, some Congressmen worried that the bill’s proposed funding fell short of what was required. However, after reviewing options for long-range financing, consensus could not be achieved and the committee reported that it would await more specific plans from the Corporation, the President, or Congress. In yet another change to the board membership clause, the committee required all to be appointed by the President, but stipulated that no more than eight directors could be members of the same political party.

During the House floor debate, members argued for and against the bill. On funding, Congressman Springer remarked, “The only alternative to financing the Corporation is appropriated funds. This presents certain danger and drawbacks. . . . It will be a man-sized job to maintain the principle of independence for the Corporation while holding the life and death purse-string. That will be the next chapter in the drama of public television and will be played on this station next season. . . . For the present we can create the major machinery and see how it functions.”⁵⁴

⁵¹John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 156.

⁵²Ibid pp: 17.

⁵³House Report on H.R. 6736, p. 16.

⁵⁴U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, Vol. 113, Part 20, p. 26,377.

Several moves were made to kill the bill. Congressman Albert Watson (R-SC) moved to strike out the section that established the CPB, but his amendment was defeated, 120 to 111. The bill passed 266 to 91 and was sent to Conference to be reconciled with the Senate version.

Passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967

In conference, the Act was loosened to allow stations to broadcast editorials introduced as “not representing the opinion of the management of the station.” “Objectivity and balance” requirements were adjusted so that “each program need not meet the test of objectivity and balance, but the series, when considered as a whole, must.”⁵⁵ Other differences were resolved, with both houses passing the compromise bill by October 1967. On November 7, President Johnson signed the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 into law. The bill:

- Established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (headed by a 15-member board appointed by the President) to oversee channeling of funds for noncommercial TV and radio production groups, stimulate programming of higher educational and cultural value through funding and recommendations to local stations and networks, and extend educational television’s audience.
- Authorized \$9 million to finance the first year (1968) of activities of the Corporation.
- Extended through fiscal 1970 the construction program under the Educational TV Facilities Act in which \$10.5M was appropriated for 1968, \$12.5M for 1969, and \$15M for 1970. Extended to radio.
- Authorized \$500,000 to HEW to conduct a study of instructional electronic media in schools.

Johnson said, “In weak or irresponsible hands, [public broadcasting] could generate controversy without understanding, mislead as well as teach. If public TV is to fulfill our hopes, then the Corporation must be representative, it must be responsible, and it must be long on enlightened leadership.”

The Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Public Broadcasting System

Congress charged CPB to build a system “in which programs of high quality, obtained from diverse sources, will be made available to noncommercial educational television and radio stations, with strict adherence to objectivity and balance” and provide “maximum protection . . . from extraneous interference and control.” Designed to commission programs from national program producers or local stations, CPB was prohibited from owning or operating broadcast, interconnection, or production facilities. Not recommended by Carnegie, CPB went on in 1970 to create two public broadcasting networks, the Public Broadcasting Service for television and National Public Radio. Established for interconnection and distribution that eventually utilized satellites, both PBS and NPR were membership corporations funded by CPB and member stations, and governed by “boards composed of representatives from stations and the public.” Unlike PBS, NPR was allowed to produce programs for member stations.

In its early years, public TV would quickly produce a range of new and innovative programs that connected with growing audiences. “The period from 1967 to 1972 was one of growth and improvement in public television. The number of TV stations increased from 126 to 233. . . . Between 1970 and 1972, the total prime-time public TV audience increased more than

⁵⁵Conference Report on S. 1160, p. 13.

30 percent. By 1972, 36 percent of households tuned at least once to public TV during an eight-week period.” In addition to federal funding, stations increased revenue from local and state government, viewer contributions, and other private support. As a result, “total income to public TV stations grew from \$58 million in 1966 to \$158 million in 1972, with federal support increasing from \$7 million to \$31 million during that period.”

However, “important elements of the vigorous and free national system that the first Carnegie Commission envisioned were still lacking,” most importantly, stable federal funding. The Ford Foundation continued as the largest funder of public TV’s national schedule. Through legislated formulas, Congress over time reduced CPB’s discretion in allocating funds. Federal funding was insufficient. By 1979, it was estimated that \$1.3 billion in total revenue was needed to operate a “first-class, full service public broadcasting system.” In the end, neither the Johnson administration nor others put forward a specific plan for sustainable, long-range financing. Instead, public broadcasting depended on uncertain annual federal appropriations subject to political influence. In 1972, President Nixon vetoed CPB’s authorization bill, citing concern over CPB’s centralized power over local stations and perceived leftist leanings. Despite resignations and a reorganization that led Nixon to approve funding, similar threats to funding would come from conservatives in the decades that followed.

In the early 1970s, CPB and PBS tangled over ambiguity in their respective roles. Debate continued about the role of advertising. Financial and human resources for robust program development were insufficient. According to Lloyd Morrisett, the Carnegie Commission’s “notion that creativity would bubble up from local stations, was erroneous because, unlike commercial broadcasting where program and production talent was developed at the center of commercial networks in New York and L.A., talent among the decentralized public broadcasting stations was lacking.”

CARNEGIE II

A decade after the Carnegie Commission disbanded, these financial, political, and structural problems led Carnegie to launch the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting. Known as Carnegie II, it differed from Carnegie I by including leaders from the established public and commercial broadcasting industries. Carnegie II’s 1979 report, *A Public Trust*, concluded that public broadcasting’s “financial, organizational, and creative structures are fundamentally flawed,” that the system was “closed, unwilling to change, and afraid of criticism,” that corporate sponsors unduly encouraged popular instead of educational programs, and that “the invention did not work, at least not very well.” The Commission recommended the CPB be replaced by a National Telecommunications Trust and appropriations increase by 500% to \$600 million, a politically unrealistic proposal that “condemned the Carnegie II report to oblivion.”⁵⁶ Although President Jimmy Carter was more supportive of public broadcasting than some other presidents, neither the White House nor Congress were ready to advocate reform or appropriations increases. Carnegie II’s proposal for a spectrum use fee met with stiff lobbying from commercial networks. Observers reported that Carnegie II attracted little attention or political support, and prompted little action.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

⁵⁶James Ledbetter, *Made Possible By...* (New York: Verson, 1997) pp. 169-170.

⁵⁷John Witherspoon & Roselle Kovitz, *A History of Public Broadcasting* (Washington DC: Current: The Public Telecommunications Newspaper, 2000) pp: 52.

Was the 1967 Carnegie Commission on Educational Television successful?

The 1967 public broadcasting bill passed through Congress in an unusually quick seven months. Why? Precedent for federal funding had been set by the ETV Facilities Act of 1962. A variety of organizations and individuals worked to influence both the content of the 1967 policy and support for it, including the National Association for Educational Broadcasters; the Ford Foundation; the Carnegie Corporation; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the White House; and members of Congress. The Carnegie Commission's prestige added clout to its recommendations. The bill had been prepared to eliminate controversial and partisan issues, some addressed through compromise, others deferred and left unresolved. Finally, President Johnson himself strongly pushed the legislation as part of his Great Society agenda when the political and social climate was supportive of such initiatives. As a result, educational and public service broadcasting was significantly expanded in America.⁵⁸

Lloyd Morrisett, who after leaving Carnegie would head the Markle Foundation and cofound the Children's Television Workshop, producer of *Sesame Street*, reflected on the Commission's impact:

The Carnegie Commission was a brilliant success in many respects, very successful for the standards of its times. Its vision for public broadcasting was brilliantly conceived and created an institution with great promise that produced wonderful and important programs. But its result, the system that was established and developed after the 1967 act, is a dysfunctional system. It is insufficiently insulated from political pressures, and has struggled with attracting talent, maintaining political support, and maintaining audiences. Relative to increasingly competitive commercial networks, the aggregate budgets for program development are extremely low. There are structural flaws, and no policy mechanism for coordinating advertising or schedules. And, the question of long-term, full funding was never resolved.

In assessing the Commission's success, Arthur Singer remarked:

Some of the recommendations Steven White and I advocated did not get into the Commission report, and some of the Commission's proposals didn't make the legislation. Other ideas, like creating the Public Broadcasting System and National Public Radio, were not recommendations of the Commission but turned out to be good things for public broadcasting. Long-term funding remains a major problem. We did intend for the government to be the principal financier of public broadcasting, but the government only pays for about 15% of total costs, which is not enough. But, the goal of the Commission was to define the need, establish a vision, and get the federal government into the act, to make a bigger investment in public broadcasting than before and to grow and strengthen the system. We succeeded at that.

⁵⁸John Edward Burke, *An Historical-Analytical Study of the Legislative and Political Origins of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967* (New York: Arno Press, 1979) pp: 230-238.

Exhibit 4

Excerpts from the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967

Public Law 90-129, 90th Congress, November 7, 1967 (as amended on April 26, 1968).
Provisions include:

- extend authorization of the earlier Educational Television Facilities Act,
- forbid educational broadcasting stations to editorialize or support or oppose political candidates,
- establish the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and defines its board,
- defines its purposes,
- authorize reduced telecommunications rates for its interconnection,
- authorize appropriations to CPB, and
- authorize a federal study of instructional television and radio.

Title I—Construction of Facilities

Extension of duration of construction grants for educational broadcasting

Sec. 101. (a) Section 391 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 391) is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: “There are also authorized to be appropriated for carrying out the purposes of such section, \$10,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, \$12,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and \$15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970.” ...

Maximum on grants in any State

Sec. 102. Effective with respect to grants made from appropriations for any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1967, subsection (b) of section 392 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 392(b)) is amended to read as follows: “(b) The total of the grants made under this part from the appropriation for any fiscal year for the construction of noncommercial educational television broadcasting facilities and noncommercial educational radio broadcasting facilities in any State may not exceed 8½ per centum of such appropriation.”

Noncommercial educational radio broadcasting facilities

Sec. 103. (a) Section 390 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 390) is amended by inserting “noncommercial” before “educational” and by inserting “or radio” after “television.” . .

Congressional Declaration of Policy

Sec. 396. (a) The Congress hereby finds and declares— “(1) that it is in the public interest to encourage the growth and development of noncommercial educational radio and television broadcasting, including the use of such media for instructional purposes;
(2) that expansion and development of noncommercial educational radio and television broadcasting and of diversity of its programming depend on freedom, imagination, and initiative on both the local and national levels;

- (3) that the encouragement and support of noncommercial educational radio and television broadcasting, while matters of importance for private and local development, are also of appropriate and important concern to the Federal Government;
- (4) that it furthers the general welfare to encourage noncommercial educational radio and television broadcast programming which will be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and throughout the United States, and which will constitute an expression of diversity and excellence;
- (5) that it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to complement, assist, and support a national policy that will most effectively make noncommercial educational radio and television service available to all the citizens of the United States;
- (6) that a private corporation should be created to facilitate the development of educational radio and television broadcasting and to afford maximum protection to such broadcasting from extraneous interference and control.

Corporation Established

(b) There is authorized to be established a nonprofit corporation, to be known as the 'Corporation for Public Broadcasting,' which will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government. The Corporation shall be subject to the provisions of this section, and, to the extent consistent with this section, to the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.

Board of Directors

- (c) (1) The Corporation shall have a Board of Directors (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 'Board'), consisting of fifteen members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than eight members of the Board may be members of the same political party.
- (2) The members of the Board (A) shall be selected from among citizens of the United States (not regular fulltime employees of the United States) who are eminent in such fields as education, cultural and civic affairs, or the arts, including radio and television; (B) shall be selected so as to provide as nearly as practicable a broad representation of various regions of the country, various professions and occupations, and various kinds of talent and experience appropriate to the functions and responsibilities of the Corporation.
- (3) The members of the initial Board of Directors shall serve as incorporators and shall take whatever actions are necessary to establish the Corporation under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.
- (4) The term of office of each member of the Board shall be six years; except that (A) any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term; and (B) the terms of office of members first taking office shall begin on the date of incorporation and shall expire, as designated at the time of their appointment, five at the end of two years, five at the end of four years, and five at the end of six years. No member shall be eligible to serve in excess of two consecutive terms of six years each. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, a member whose term has expired may serve until his successor has qualified.
- (5) Any vacancy in the Board shall not affect its power, but shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointments were made.

Election of Chairman

(d) (1) The President shall designate one of the members first appointed to the Board as Chairman; thereafter the members of the Board shall annually elect one of their number as

Chairman. The members of the Board shall also elect one or more of them as a Vice Chairman or Vice Chairmen. . . .

Officers and Employees

(e) (1) The Corporation shall have a President, and such other officers as may be named and appointed by the Board for terms and at rates of compensation fixed by the Board. . . . All officers shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.

(2) Except as provided in the second sentence of subsection (c) (1) of this section, no political test or qualification shall be used in selecting, appointing, promoting, or taking other personnel actions with respect to officers, agents, and employees of the Corporation.

Nonprofit and Nonpolitical Nature of the Corporation

(f) (1) The Corporation shall have no power to issue any shares of stock, or to declare or pay any dividends.

(2) No part of the income or assets of the Corporation shall inure to the benefit of any director, officer, employee, or any other individual except as salary or reasonable compensation for services.

(3) The Corporation may not contribute to or otherwise support any political party or candidate for elective public office.

Purposes and Activities of the Corporation

(g) (1) In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes of this subpart, as set out in subsection (a), the Corporation is authorized to—

(A) facilitate the full development of educational broadcasting in which programs of high quality, obtained from diverse sources, will be made available to noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast stations, with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature;

(B) assist in the establishment and development of one or more systems of interconnection to be used for the distribution of educational television or radio programs so that all noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast stations that wish to may broadcast the programs at times chosen by the stations;

(C) assist in the establishment and development of one or more systems of noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast stations throughout the United States;

(D) carry out its purposes and functions and engage in its activities in ways that will most effectively assure the maximum freedom of the noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast systems and local stations from interference with or control of program content or other activities.

(2) Included in the activities of the Corporation authorized for accomplishment of the purposes set forth in subsection (a) of this section, are, among others not specifically named— “(A) to obtain grants from and to make contracts with individuals and with private, State, and Federal agencies, organizations, and institutions;

(B) to contract with or make grants to program production entities, individuals, and selected noncommercial educational broadcast stations for the production of, and otherwise to procure, educational television or radio programs for national or regional distribution to noncommercial educational broadcast stations;

(C) to make payments to existing and new noncommercial educational broadcast stations to aid in financing local educational television or radio programming costs of such stations, particularly innovative approaches thereto, and other costs of operation of such stations;

- (D) to establish and maintain a library and archives of noncommercial educational television or radio programs and related materials and develop public awareness of and disseminate information about noncommercial educational television or radio broadcasting by various means, including the publication of a journal;
 - (E) to arrange, by grant or contract with appropriate public or private agencies, organizations, or institutions, for interconnection facilities suitable for distribution and transmission of educational television or radio programs to noncommercial educational broadcast stations;
 - (F) to hire or accept the voluntary services of consultants, experts, advisory boards, and panels to aid the Corporation in carrying out the purposes of this section;
 - (G) to encourage the creation of new noncommercial educational broadcast stations in order to enhance such service on a local, State, regional, and national basis;
 - (H) conduct (directly or through grants or contracts) research, demonstrations, or training in matters related to noncommercial educational television or radio broadcasting.
- (3) To carry out the foregoing purposes and engage in the foregoing activities, the Corporation shall have the usual powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, except that the Corporation may not own or operate any television or radio broadcast station, system, or network, community antenna television system, or interconnection or program production facility.

Authorization for Free or Reduced Rate Interconnection Service

(h) Nothing in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, or in any other provision of law shall be construed to prevent United States communications common carriers from rendering free or reduced rate communications interconnection services for noncommercial educational television or radio services, subject to such rules and regulations as the Federal Communications Commission may prescribe.

Report to Congress

(i) The Corporation shall submit an annual report for the preceding fiscal year ending June 30 to the President for transmittal to the Congress on or before the 31st day of December of each year. The report shall include a comprehensive and detailed report of the Corporation's operations, activities, financial condition, and accomplishments under this section and may include such recommendations as the Corporation deems appropriate. . . .

Financing

- (k) (1) There are authorized to be appropriated for expenses of the Corporation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, the sum of \$9,000,000, to remain available until expended.
- (2) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, no grant or contract pursuant to this section may provide for payment from the appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, for any one project or to any one station of more than \$250,000. . . .

Title III—Study of Educational and Instructional Broadcasting

Study authorized

Sec. 301. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is authorized to conduct, directly or by contract, and in consultation with other interested Federal agencies, a comprehensive study of instructional television and radio (including broadcast, closed circuit, community antenna television, and instructional television fixed services and two-way communication of data links and computers) and their relationship to each other and to instructional materials such as videotapes, films, discs, computers, and other educational materials or devices, and such other

aspects thereof as may be of assistance in determining whether and what Federal aid should be provided for instructional radio and television and the form that aid should take, and which may aid communities, institutions, or agencies in determining whether and to what extent such activities should be used.

Duration of study

Sec. 302. The study authorized by this title shall be submitted to the President for transmittal to the Congress on or before June 30, 1969.

Appropriation

Sec. 303. There are authorized to be appropriated for the study authorized by this title such sums, not exceeding \$500,000, as may be necessary.

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Public Broadcasting Act of 1967." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/legislation/PBA67.html>.

Exhibit 5

Proposal on Formation of the Public Television Network, 1968

On September 23, 1968, a little more than a year before the formation of PBS, two officials of the newly created Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Ward B. Chamberlin and Robert D.B. Carlisle, drafted this proposal for a new nonprofit network that would interconnect public television stations:

INTRODUCTORY

The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, and the intensive discussions that preceded its enactment, have given high priority to the establishment of a nationwide interconnected television network to serve public TV daily.

To give this system dedicated and professional management in keeping with its significant objectives, formation of an independent organization will be necessary. This new entity would be known as the PUBLIC TELEVISION NETWORK (PTN). As soon as regular network time has been negotiated with AT&T, and in order to act promptly at that time, the basic plan for PTN should be agreed upon now.

GENERAL

Operation of a television network is an intricate process. The experience of commercial TV, which has been in the business of coast-to-coast networking since 1951, demonstrates that this process requires mature and wise management, engineering design and operating capabilities of a high degree, and an in-depth aptitude for working effectively in a crisis atmosphere where over a hundred stations and millions of viewers are the clients.

Public television may not attain these goals overnight but it must plan on this basis. In certain respects, PTV must plan even more intelligently. PTN management must recognize that its first obligation is to the individual stations. They are the core of the system. They, and the regional systems of which they may be a part, must be able to break away from the national network to transmit their own local programs. PTN must be ready at all times to adapt itself to this transcendent fact of life in public broadcasting.

Beyond recognizing the primary importance of the individual station's needs, PTN must be prepared to respond to other factors and forces. It is expected that the regional networks will be represented in establishing PTN practices; these networks will hold options on cutting away from the national network or transmitting programs into it. In addition, PTN will have to take into account the roles of the major suppliers of programming for public TV -- NET, eventually a second national producer of the same magnitude, and the expanding libraries from which special-purpose programming emanate (ETS Program Service, N.I.T.).

To develop a contemporary approach for reacting to these various organizations while assuring the viewers of responsible and consistent service, it becomes essential to define a network structure that on the one hand is independent and yet on the other provides its clients and users with a major voice. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting cannot operate PTN. The Act states this: "... the Corporation may not own or operate any television or radio broadcasting station, system, or network, community antenna television system, or interconnection or program production facility." CPB will participate in PTN, as it will be, in most likelihood, its largest source of funds. But the decisions and practices PTN adopts will be those of a separate management organization responding principally to the needs of the stations and, most

importantly, their respective viewers.

THE PTN STRUCTURE

PTN will be established as a corporation with three levels of authority, a staff of managers and technicians, and operating facilities on both the East and West coasts. Formed as a New York membership corporation, it will be a non-profit organization qualifying for tax-exempt status under Federal and State law.

Levels of Authority

1. A group of five Members is proposed. Their primary function will be to elect the Board of Directors.

It will be appropriate for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to initiate selection of the Members without exercising exclusive control of this process. The five men will be nationally prominent representatives of institutions, foundations, and the professions. In view of the major role that CPB will play in financing the Network, it would be proper for the Chairman of CPB to be one of the five. In choosing candidates for the Board of Directors, the Members will be motivated primarily by recommendations solicited from the public TV broadcasters.

2. There will be a thirteen-member Board of Directors for PTN. The Board's chief purpose will be to set general policies. It will select the Network's President. It will not take part in operational decisions. The Board will be composed of (1) six Directors representing the stations, (2) four representing production centers, (3) two representing the public, and (4) one representing CPB. The Members, in electing groups (1) and (2), will act upon recommendations presented to them as set forth below. The Directors drawn from the stations will be elected at-large. This to ensure selection of the best possible candidates, without regard for regional representation. Regional systems will gain representation in the Operations Committee.

Station-associated Board members can be selected in a special election at-large. Or this may be accomplished through a pre-existent organization of station managers, such as the Educational Television Stations Board of NAEB. Initially, all four Directors from production centers will be from NET. Later on, when a second center has been formed, two Directors would be nominated from it. Eventually, therefore, NET will have two members. CPB will nominate one Director, either its President or its Vice-President for Programming. Public members of the Board will be chosen by the Members of PTN, after consultation with key individuals in public broadcasting and consideration of nominations submitted by any interested PTV group. The President of PTN, once he has been selected by the Board, will attend its meetings in an ex-officio capacity, without voting prerogatives. While all members of the Board of Directors will be elected by the Members of the Corporation, it is to be understood that the Membership will adhere in most cases to the recommendations presented by the respective groups.

3. The Operations Committee of PTN will consist of ten members, two of them non-voting. Through conference calls, teletype exchanges, and regular meetings, this Committee, in conjunction with the PTN President, will make the day-to-day decisions essential for the operation of the Network. In the construction of this Committee, once again the primary emphasis is given to the stations themselves -- in this instance, through the regional network representatives responsible to them. Five members of the Committee will be the Executive Directors of the respective regional systems EEN, SECA, CEN, RMPB, and WEN. Vice-Presidents for Programming of CPB, NET, and the eventual second national production center will also serve on the Committee. The final two positions on the Committee will be held by the Director of Operations and the Director of Public Information of PTN. Neither will be able to vote.

RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

A clear definition of the respective mandates of the Board of Directors and the Operations Committee will have to be evolved. Broad outlines conceived by the Members can be developed into specific patterns by the Board.

In its majority, the Board will represent the ultimate consumer -- the station and its viewers. At the same time, it will represent users of the system -- the production centers and the libraries. Its broad obligation, then, becomes one of developing a general formula for the use of the national interconnection which (1) protects the best interests of the consumers, and (2) makes the best uses of materials generated by the users.

It is to be expected that the Board will define the general breakdown of time allocations for Network usage. This definition will be developed in response to presentations from the national program producers and libraries, meshed with requests for general blocks of service (or non-service) from the regional networks. Station-associated Board members would have the largest voice in framing this pattern.

In addition to generalized allocations, the Board may choose to respond to long-range projections on critical events presented by the national producers, the regional networks, and others. Major activities such as the President's State of the Union Address can be forecast many months in advance as a significant, historical moment conceivably worthy of an entire evening's related programming on PTN.

In no respect will the Board control program production. It will not solicit programming from producers or regions. On the contrary, it will make decisions based on consumer needs and on assessing the overall inventory of materials that are potentially available for PTN use. Characteristically, PTN users will present long-range plans and their requests for PTN time allocations. Decisions made at the Board of Directors level will take cognizance of the cardinal fact that a long-range schedule of allocations may have to yield to short-range changes. The news shifts dramatically, or significant cultural and informational events are scheduled. It is at this critical point that the Operations Committee performs a key function.

This Committee is charged, in general terms, with executing the pattern of allocations established by the Board. Broad breakdowns of time are translated into specific day-to-day schedules, which, in turn, are transmitted to all stations and regional systems. At the same time, the PTN Public Information staff begins the process of promoting widely and intensively the programs selected for transmission on the Network. PTN information materials will be offered to the individual stations for their local use; at the same time, PTN will develop nationally applicable promotional items that coincide with Board of Directors policies.

It must be expected that the daily schedule will change frequently. The Operations Committee, responding to conference calls, can make ready decisions on removing predetermined programming from that evening's schedule to provide the stations with a nationally or regionally produced special program on an event of major importance.

THE OPERATIONS CENTERS

Operation of the Network will require two centers. In each case, they can be superimposed on an existing PTV station. One would be located at WNDT, in New York City. The second would be at KCET, Los Angeles.

Each of the centers will transmit regularly into the Network. On special occasions, outlying stations will also be able to transmit into the system by arrangement with the Operations Committee and the PTN staff. The West Coast center will have the added responsibility of serving as the time-delay point for PTN. It will record programs originating from the East for delayed transmission to its regional consumers.

The relationship of the centers to their "host" stations will have to be analyzed and determined by the Board. It is important to establish with the station that the center is a separate facility, both in manpower and in machines. Presence of the center at the station can be come a significant factor in aiding that broadcaster's total development, in reflection of the fact that PTN will pay the stations a service fee for housing the operations nucleus.

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Proposal on Formation of the Public Television Network, 1968." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/documents/PTNproposal68.html>.

Exhibit 6

Excerpts from Articles of Incorporation of Public Broadcasting Service

On November 3, 1969, four public broadcasters, including the presidents of Corporation for Public Broadcasting and National Educational Television (NET), incorporated a new nonprofit organization to interconnect the public television stations, taking on those functions of NET:

We, the undersigned, natural persons of the age of twenty-one (21) years or more, and citizens of the United States, desiring to form a nonprofit corporation pursuant to the District of Columbia Non-Profit Corporations Act (28 D.C. Code Chapter 10), adopt the following Articles of Incorporation for such Corporation:

ARTICLE I.

The name of the Corporation is: PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE.

ARTICLE II.

The period of duration of the Corporation is perpetual.

ARTICLE III.

The purposes for which the Corporation is organized are:

1. To establish, develop, own, manage and operate one or more interconnection systems, facilities or services, to be used for the distribution of broadcast programs to noncommercial broadcast stations and networks;
2. To interconnect national, regional; state and local noncommercial broadcast stations, networks, systems, facilities and services by wired, wireless, satellite or other apparatus or equipment appropriate therefore;
3. To lease, rent, acquire and own, and to order, have, use and contract for, and to otherwise obtain, arrange for and provide interconnection facilities for origination and transmission of broadcast programs to noncommercial broadcast stations, networks, facilities and systems;
4. To determine, allocate, apportion and assign the use of the interconnection systems, facilities and services so provided for the distribution of noncommercial broadcast programs to noncommercial broadcast stations and networks;
5. To establish and maintain one or more service or services for the duplication, storage and distribution of broadcast programs on motion picture film, videotape or any other means or mechanism suitable for supplemental transmission and exhibition thereof;
6. To arrange for interconnection with foreign broadcasting systems and networks for international program distribution purposes;
7. To develop, prepare and publish information, research and reports relating to noncommercial broadcasting interconnection and distribution and to the broadcast programs transmitted and distributed thereby;

8. To otherwise administer, forward and advance the development and operation of interconnection and distribution systems, facilities and services, and to complement, assist and support noncommercial broadcasting pursuant to the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, as it may from time to time be amended.

Notwithstanding the generality of the foregoing, the Corporation shall not engage in the production of broad cast programs; nor shall the Corporation apply for or accept a license to own or operate any noncommercial or other broadcast station under the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. . . .

ARTICLE VII.

2. The Corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, educational, scientific and literary purposes, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or the corresponding provision of any future United States Internal Revenue Law). . . .

ARTICLE X.

The number of directors constituting the Initial Board of Directors is four (4), and the names and addresses of those who are to serve as the Initial Directors until their successors are elected and qualified are:

Hartford N. Gunn, Jr.
125 Western Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02134

John W. Macy, Jr.
888 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Kenneth A. Christiansen
Cedar Avenue
Pine Hill Estate
Gainesville, Florida 32601

James Day
115 East 86th Street
New York, New York 10028

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Articles of Incorporation of Public Broadcasting Service." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/documents/PBSarticles69.html>.


Exhibit 7

Federal Appropriation History, Corporation for Public Broadcasting

Curve of federal appropriations to CPB, 1969-2001.

Opponents of aid to public broadcasting created plateaus in CPB spending in early 1980s and again in 1990s. But the general upward swing of this chart doesn't mean more spending power. After adjusting for inflation, FY2000's \$300M is worth 5% less than FY90 figure of \$229.4M.

Figures are rising again since failure of the zero-it-out movement: \$300M for FY2000 and \$340M for FY2001.



CPB's first appropriation in FY68 was just \$5M, but from there the sum often rose by \$10M or \$20M a year.

Reagan-era cutbacks halted CPB's rise for years, starting with \$35M cut in FY 83 (to \$137M).

Extra appropriations in FY91-93 on top of these sums add up to almost \$200M for replacement of public TV's and public radio's original satellite systems.

Congress usually votes on CPB aid two years in advance as "insulation" for publiccasting. But lateness of 1995 decision on FY96 amount, just five months before fiscal year began, undercut the principle. Congress rescinded \$7M for FY95, \$37M for FY96 and \$55M for FY97 (to \$260M).

Appropriations for five years, FY 1997-2001, were enacted without the usual prerequisite—an authorization bill.

Source: Public Broadcasting PolicyBase, "Curve of federal appropriations to CPB, 1969-2001." Retrieved from <http://www.current.org/pbpb/statistics/cpbappropscurve.html>.

Exhibit 8

Corporation for Public Broadcasting Federal Appropriation History

Figures shown are representative of millions of dollars (ex. \$5.0 = \$5,000,000.00).

FISCAL YEAR	ADMINISTRATION REQUEST	HOUSE ALLOCATION	SENATE ALLOCATION	APPROPRIATION
2008	a			
2007	a	\$400.0	\$400.0	\$400.0
2006	a b c	\$335.0	\$400.0	\$400.0
2005	a b	\$380.0	\$395.0	\$386.8 d
2004	a b	\$365.0	\$395.0	\$377.8 e
2003	\$365.0	\$365.0	\$365.0	\$362.8 f
2002	\$350.0	\$340.0	\$350.0	\$350.0
2001	\$340.0	\$340.0	\$340.0	\$340.0
2000	\$325.0	\$300.0	\$300.0	\$300.0
Notes	<p>a. The Administration declined to request advance funding for CPB. b. The Administration's Budget request would permit the use of CPB's general appropriation to fund the digital transition and television interconnection as follows: FY 2004 up to \$80 million for digital transition and up to \$20 million for interconnection; FY 2005 up to \$20 million for digital transition and up to \$75 million for television interconnection; FY 2006 up to \$30 million for digital television transition and up to \$52 million for television interconnection. c. The President's FY2006 Budget included \$10 million rescission from CPB FY2006 advance appropriation of \$400 million. d. FY2005 funding (\$390 million) reduced by 0.80% across-the-board rescission in P.L. 108-447. e. FY 2004 funding reduced from \$380 million in P.L. 108-199. f. FY 2003 funding reduced from \$365 million in P.L. 108-7 by 0.65%; however Congress gave small agencies additional administrative dollars which translated to \$181,000 for CPB; this was also subject to the same rescission</p>			
1999	\$275.0	\$250.0	\$250.0	\$250.0
1998	\$296.4	\$240.0	\$260.0	\$250.0
1997	\$292.6	b	\$330.0	\$260.0 c
1996	\$292.6	\$292.6	\$320.0	\$275.0 c
1995	\$275.0	\$271.6	\$310.0	\$285.6 d
1994	\$260.0	\$253.3	\$284.0	\$275.0
1993	\$306.5 a	\$306.5 a	\$341.9	\$318.6 a
1992	\$242.1	\$314.1 a	\$340.5 a	\$327.3 a
1991	\$214.0	b	\$302.5 a	\$298.9 a
1990	\$214.0	\$238.0	\$248.0	\$229.4 e
Notes	<p>a. Includes funds appropriated for the Satellite Replacement Fund. b. Allowance not included in House Bill because of lack of authorizing legislation. Senate allowance considered by House Conferees at conference on Appropriation Bill(s). c. FY 1996 funding reduced from \$312 million and FY 1997 funding reduced from \$315 million in P.L. 104-19. d. Reduced from \$292.6 million in P.L. 103-333. e. Reduced FY 1990 Sequestration.</p>			
FISCAL YEAR	ADMINISTRATION REQUEST	HOUSE ALLOCATION	SENATE ALLOCATION	APPROPRIATION
1989	\$214.0	\$214.0	\$238.0	\$228.0

1988	\$214.0	a	\$214.0	\$214.0
1987	\$186.0	a	\$238.0	\$200.0
1986	\$75.0	\$130.0	\$130.0	\$159.5
1985	\$85.0	\$130.0	\$130.0	\$150.5
1984	\$110.0	\$110.0	\$130.0	\$137.5
1983	\$172.0	\$172.0	\$172.0	\$137.0
1982	\$172.0	\$172.0	\$172.0	\$172.0
1981	\$162.0	\$162.0	\$162.0	\$162.0
1980	\$120.0	\$145.0	\$172.0	\$152.0
Notes	a. Allowance not included in House Bill because of lack of authorizing legislation. Senate allowance considered by House Conferees at conference on Appropriation Bill(s).			
1979	\$90.0	\$120.2	\$140.0	\$120.2
1978	\$80.0	\$107.1	\$121.1	\$119.2
1977	\$70.0	\$96.7	\$103.0	\$103.0
TQ a	\$17.0	\$17.5	\$17.5	\$17.5
1976	\$70.0	\$78.5	\$78.5	\$78.5
1975	\$60.0	\$60.0	\$65.0	\$62.0
1974	\$45.0	b	\$55.0	\$50.0
1973	\$45.0	\$45.0	\$45.0	\$35.0
1972	\$35.0	\$35.0	\$35.0	\$35.0
1971	\$22.0	b	\$27.0	\$23.0
1970	\$15.0	b	\$15.0	15.0
1969	\$9.0	b	\$6.0	\$5.0
Notes	a. Transition Quarter funding, during which federal budget year changed from July to September. b. Allowance not included in House Bill because of lack of authorizing legislation. Senate allowance considered by House Conferees at conference on Appropriation Bill(s).			

Source: Corporation for Public Broadcasting, "Federal Appropriation History." Retrieved from <http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/financials/appropriation/history.html>